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11 August 1959

Copy No. C 63

# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



DOCUMENT NO.

NO CHANGE IN CLASS.

DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:

AUTH: HR/20-2

DATE PREVIEWER

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

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Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600360001-1 25X1 Pakistan: The Pakistani military regime, in its most authoritarian measure to date, on 7 August promulgated an order barring from public office for the next seven years persons found guilty of any act "which contributes to political instability." The regime apparently intends to ban from politics anyone considered capable of developing opposition to the regime in advance of the local-level elections planned for October. This step illustrates the Ayub government's intent to retain firm control while establishing a facade of constitu-25X1 tional democracy. African conference: The nine independent African states meeting at Monrovia from 4 to 8 August adopted comparatively moderate resolutions on Algeria and other issues of common concern, but the anticipated increase in their involvement with Algeria may strain relations with France. Guinea announced its readiness to consider an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Algerian provisional government. This put heavy pressure on Liberia, which has reportedly agreed to recognize the rebel government in the near future despite earlier warnings that Paris might break off diplomatic rela-25X1 tions. III. THE WEST Cyprus: Greek-Turkish negotiations over implementation of last February's Cyprus settlement appear to be reaching a critical stage. The dispute involves conflicting interpretations of the executive powers which the accord gave to the Turkish Cypriot vice president. The matter probably will have to be referred back to the signatories of the agreement, the Greek and

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DAILY BRIEF

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25X1	Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A004600360001-1								
25X1	Turkish premiers, for solution. Failure to resolve this issue to the satisfaction of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, however, could endanger the entire Cyprus settlement.								
Argentina: The Peronista call for a 24-hour general on 11 August is ostensibly in support of the striking Tucus sugar workers. The Peronista labor leaders may, however wish to test the discipline of their own unions and, probable the aid of the Communist-led unions, the vulnerability of government to wage demands. If this strike is effective, hasten threatened strike calls against the railroads, power and metallurgical industries. It could also provide cover								25X 25X1	
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## Pakistani Military Regime Moves Against Politicians

The Pakistani military regime on 7 August promulgated an "Elective Bodies Disqualification Order" under which any persons not acceptable to the regime can be barred from public office for the next seven years. This step was taken apparently in anticipation of local elections scheduled for October. Although President Ayub's regime plans to establish a facade of constitutional democracy, it intends to retain firm control of the government for the indefinite future.

The order is the most authoritarian measure taken by the regime to date. Special tribunals can bar from office any person found guilty of such broadly defined offenses as "contributing to political instability" and "any other abuse of whatever kind of power or position." Accused persons may not have legal counsel when appearing before the tribunals, and no appeal is to be permitted. The order is to apply to religious and business figures as well as to politicians.

Ayub's action is almost certain to arouse strong resentment among the politically conscious segments of the population. The general public would probably welcome action against the more notorious politicians ousted by the order. However, if the regime applies the order to popular figures and to broad sections of local leadership, the public would be likely to resent such measures as obvious dictatorial moves by the regime to perpetuate itself in power.

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## African Conference at Monrovia Takes Moderate Position

The conference of nine independent African states and the Algerian provisional government, held at Monrovia from 4 to 8 August, adopted comparatively moderate resolutions. The principal subject of discussion was the Algerian situation. The conference also listened to appeals for a review of the racial and political problems in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to a nationalist attack on British policies in Uganda, to a plea for support of Cameroun nationalist extremists, and to a demand for international discussion of the UN trust territory of Ruanda Urundi, which is administered by Belgium.

In a unanimous resolution, the representatives asked France to recognize the right of the Algerian people to self-determination leading to independence, to end hostilities and withdraw its troops from Algeria, and to enter into negotiations with the provisional government of Algeria. The conference recommended that each government prepare for the forthcoming debate in the UN, continue diplomatic action in favor of the Algerian nationalists, and give material aid to the rebels.

Any strengthening of ties between African states and the Algerian rebels will adversely affect relations between France and those governments. Nevertheless, the Guinea delegation announced that Conakry would consider an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Algerian provisional government, and Monrovia, ignoring a French threat to break diplomatic relations with nations recognizing the Algerian rebel government, reportedly will make a public announcement of recognition in several weeks.

Thus Ethiopia appears to be the only African state at the conference not intending to recognize the Algerian rebels, although it will probably support the Asian-African bloc in the UN debate this	
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## III. THE WEST

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Dispute Over Constitution Threatens Cyprus Settlement

A serious dispute, which could threaten the Cyprus settlement of last February, has arisen among the negotiators preparing the constitution for the new Republic of Cyprus. The Constitutional Commission--composed of representatives of Greece, Turkey, and the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and aided by a Swiss legal adviser--has been working for several weeks on a constitution in line with the basic structure of government agreed to by the Greek and Turkish premiers last winter.

Article Five of the Greek-Turkish agreement is subject to differing interpretations on the extent of executive power--particularly the right of veto--granted to the Turkish Cypriot vice president. The Turks are claiming that Article Five implies "joint" or equal authority between the Greek Cypriot president and the vice president. Greek Cypriot representatives on the commission, backed by Makarios, reject the contention that the two men have equal powers and state that the vice-presidential powers are strictly limited by succeeding articles of the original agreement.

The issue, described by the American consul general as "grave," will apparently be referred back to Athens and Ankarapossibly to the premiers themselves. Resolution of this issue will be difficult, however, in light of the adamant demand of the Greek Cypriots that the primacy of the president be recognized. Greek Cypriot leaders have indicated that their firmness on the question stems in part from fear that EOKA leader Grivas may otherwise use any retreat by them on the question as evidence of a "sellout" to the Turks. By this admission, they give support to expressed Turkish Cypriot fears that Grivas' recent criticism of Makarios will tend to make the moderate Greek Cypriots more intransigent and a final settlement more difficult.

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